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Introduction: 
 
Only 65 years ago, the European Integration process took off. If one would have stated then that the 
ECSC would result in a European Union with a single currency, European law, and free movement of 
capital, people, services and goods, politicians would probably say: “impossible”. Yet these days the 
EU has all these things. However, national authorities have not given up their full sovereignty yet, 
making the EU a project often referred to as ‘Sui Generis’.
1
 With power at both supranational and 
intergovernmental level, the EU is unlike anything in the world: not an International Organisation, 
but not a true state or federation either. Instead, the EU is an increasingly complex political and 
social-economic landscape. 
 
For students of International Relations, the European Union therefore forms an interesting object of 
study. European Union Studies aims to analyse and explore the complex EU landscape, by looking at 
the internal and external developments of the post-war era and examine the current state of affairs 
within the EU. One debate is central in this: how can European Integration best be explained, and 
more importantly, what does this mean for the future of the EU? In other words, where is the EU 
going? In this debate, two major IR-theories have emerged: Intergovernmentalism and Neo-
Functionalism. Both analyse the European Integration process, but the way these theories deal with 
their main drivers and the future of the EU is different. 
 
Neo-Functionalism was first set up by Ernst Haas, and considers integration to be driven by created 
institutions. The aim is to integrate individual sectors to achieve spill-over affects: this refers to 
situations where an initial decision by governments to place a certain sector under the authority of 
central institutions, results in pressure to extend authority of that institution to a neighbouring area 
of policy. Thus, Neo-Functionalism believes integration to be self-sustaining: spill-over will trigger 
economic and political dynamics that drive further cooperation. In other words, integration in one 
sector will be likely to create its own drive to spread to other sectors. Integration is therefore driven 
by created institutions – even if originally it was not aimed to do so.  
 
Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, sees states (and national governments in particular) as 
the main actors in the integration process. It is thus conflicting with the theory of Neo-
Functionalism. Intergovernmentalism was a.o. developed by Andrew Moravcsik, who stated that any 
increase in power at the supranational level results from a direct decision by governments.
2
 Periods 
of radical change in the European Union are seen to be the result of converging governmental 
preferences, while periods of inactivity are ascribed to diverging national interests. 
Intergovernmentalism further assumes that government preferences are exogenous – in other 
words, are not formed or changed in the course of international negotiations or by international 
                                                          
1
 For example: Krzysztof Feliks Sliwinski, “Moving Beyond the European Union’s weakness as a Cyber-Security 
Agent”. Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 35, Nr 3, 2014. Pages 468-486. URL: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2014.959261?journalCode=fcsp20#.VYqnxU3759A  
2
 Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union”, 
Center for European Studies, Working Paper No. 92, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 40, Issue 04, 
2002, pages 603-624. URL: http://aei.pitt.edu/9136/1/Moravcsik92.pdf 
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institutions.
3
 Summarizing, Intergovernmentalism states that the level and speed of European 
Integration are controlled by national governments. 
 
This central debate is applicable at two levels. On the one hand, there is a theoretical debate about 
what the EU exactly entails and where it is going. On the other hand, it is also a practical debate, 
since Intergovernmentalism and Neo-Functionalism are existing next to each other in the EU. The 
question here is: should the institutions or Member States control EU integration? The outcome of 
this debate can be found in the different decision making procedures for different policy areas. 
Features of Neo-Functionalism exist in the EU’s trade policy, which has been brought to the 
supranational level. Here, the main legislative power is the European Commission, proposals are 
subject to Qualified Majority Voting in the Council, and eventual decisions override national laws. 
However, Member States have not given up their sovereignty yet: in areas such as foreign policy and 
security the EU has little to no competences. In the ‘special legislative procedure’ applied in these 
policy areas, clear intergovernmentalist features exist. The most powerful body in this procedure is 
the European Council (heads of state or government), which votes by unanimity. At times this hybrid 
structure is an issue: Member States want to keep their voice in certain areas, while EU action might 
also be necessary to act decisive in these fields. 
 
In this thesis, Cybersecurity will be researched as part of the central debate. In the field of 
Cybersecurity, the clash between decision making on the national and EU level is specifically 
problematic. The internet challenges the traditional Westphalia notion of sovereignty: it has created 
a new dimension for transnationality in which thinking in state terms will no longer suffice. To solve 
the problems connected to Cyberspace politicians therefore have to step away from their classical 
political and IR-perspectives and find solutions beyond their state. In other words, because of the 
transnational character of Cyberspace, the approach against Cyber related problems should also be 
transnational. This is especially true as the internet is ever growing, while threats are emerging more 
often and are getting more advanced. In dealing with them a state-by-state approach will not suffice. 
Although both Member States and the EU realise this, a general and overarching EU Cybersecurity 
policy has not yet emerged.
4
 This does not mean that the EU has not done anything to address 
Cyberthreats: recently, a Cyber Security Strategy was launched
5
, a Digital Agenda for Europe was set 
                                                          
3
 Jeremy Richardson and Sonia Mazey, “European Union: Power and Policy-making”, Routledge, Fourth Edition, 
2015, page 40. URL: 
https://books.google.nl/books?id=l0ihBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA39&lpg=PA39&dq=intergovernmentalism+ir&source=
bl&ots=E7Zkz3oj4t&sig=hoCZAZTCoGnsO029gfx09M1gm-
Q&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=X8MwVZjuBtHraq6ugMAC&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=intergovernmentalism%20i
r&f=false 
4
 European Cyber Security Protection Alliance (CYSPA), “D2.2.1 – Impact contribution and approaches – 
European Policies and directives”, Project Number FP7-ICT-2011-8 / 318355. 31 December 2013. 
Page 29. 
5
 European Commission (E.COM) and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR), Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An 
Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace”. Brussels, 07-02-2013. JOIN (2013) 1 Final. 
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up
6
 and a directive on Network and Information Security was issued.
7
 The aim of all these policies is 
to ensure a high level of Network and Information Security across the EU.
8
 However, the EU still 
receives much criticism on its policy
9
, giving rise to the question whether the European strategy is in 
fact decisive. This thesis will look into this, by asking the research question: 
 
 
“To what extent is Europe decisive in its Cybersecurity policy?” 
 
 
To answer this question it is first of all crucial to define what “Cybersecurity” and “Decisiveness” 
exactly entails. The notion of “Cybersecurity” is not easy to define. As will be explained in Chapter 
two, there is no common European definition on Cybersecurity yet. The term “Cybersecurity” in this 
thesis should therefore be read in the broadest sense. In defining it “Cybersecurity” will be 
considered to be any form of protection against any sort of Cyberattack. On a scale of impact it is 
thus not limited to a single citizens’ privacy (on the lowest level), nor to Cyberwarfare (on the 
highest level). Protection against Cyberbullying, Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism and Cyberwarfare 
therefore all fall under the umbrella of Cybersecurity.  
 
In measuring Cybersecurity decisiveness, the definition of Cox and McCubbins will be used. Cox and 
McCubbins have defined “policy decisiveness” as “an ability to decide or to pursue a consistent 
policy”, and propose several political institutional factors that determine state (in)decisiveness. First 
of all, they argue separation of power will lead to indecisiveness. This separation can be found 
between executive and legislative powers (presidentialism), within a legislative body (bicameralism) 
or across different levels of government (federalism). Second, independent actors in the political 
bargaining process make it harder to initiate and maintain collective action. Hence, so is argued, the 
more actors (such as parties or factions) there are in the legislature, the more indecisive the 
country.
10
 
 
This definition of Cox and McCubbins is clearly set up for state decisiveness. The EU is not a state: it 
is, as mentioned earlier, a ‘Sui Generis’ institution. Nevertheless, the notion that many independent 
actors in the political process lead to policy indecisiveness, can also be applied in the case of the EU - 
                                                          
6
 The European Commission’s “Digital Agenda For Europe” was launched as part of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
The main objective is to develop a digital single market in order to generate smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth in Europe. It is made up of seven pillars. (More Info available at: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/digital-agenda-europe-2020-strategy) 
7
 E.COM Proposal for a “Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to 
ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union”. Brussels, 07-02-2013. 
(COM)2013, 48 Final. 
8
 Portal European Commission, Digital Agenda for Europe, Cybersecurity and Privacy - Cybersecurity. Available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/cybersecurity 
9
 For example: Presentation by Ex-Hackers Ralf Bendrath & Florian Walther, “ The EU approach to 
Cybersecurity and Cybercrime: From the Virtual Schengen Border to Criminalising Hacker Devices”, Sigint 
Conference 2012 (May 2012). 
10
 Definition of Cox & McCubbins as stated in Kyung Joon Han, “Policy decisiveness and responses to 
speculative attacks in developed countries”, European Journal of Political Research, Volume 48, Number 6, 
2009, pages 723-755, specifically page 730. URL: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01835.x/epdf 
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and thus in this study. Just as the number of parties in the legislature affect the policy process, the 
number of governments and institutions in the EU structure does as well. The more parties involved 
in the decision making process, the more difficult it is to initiate collective action. 
 
This thesis complements Cox and McCubbins’ definition with a criterion of policy speed. As 
developments in the Cyberworld are rapid, acting decisive in the field of Cybersecurity means 
adapting quickly to these new developments. In this, an inherent supranational element can be 
recognized in Cybersecurity. This has implications for the policy procedure: when twenty eight states 
will have to reach consensus, reaching a decision will be slower than when a procedure of majority 
voting will be applied. Thus, speed in the decision making process is crucial for Europe’s decisiveness 
in Cybersecurity. In answering the research question, these three criteria (separation of powers, 
many independent actors in the political bargaining process, and policy speed) are used extensively. 
 
 
In the first chapter, the focus is on the separation of powers criterion. This chapter analyses the 
establishment of a common European Cybersecurity policy. To do so, a popular method among 
historians is used: several crucial (‘watershed’) moments in a relevant period of history are picked, 
through which the entire policy development of that period is described. In this case, four watershed 
moments in Cybersecurity history (1990-present) are analysed: the first EU initiative on 
Cybersecurity policy (1990), the first international convention on Cybersecurity (2001), the first 
major Cyberattack against a country (2007), and the first use of a Cyberweapon with physical 
damage (2010). The sub question in this part of the analysis is: “Have certain ‘watershed’ moments 
influenced Europe’s Cybersecurity policy? If so, in what way?” 
 
In the second chapter, the focus is on the amount of independent actors in the political bargaining 
process. In this part, the current Cybersecurity policy situation is analysed. This is done with the sub 
question: “What barriers exist in this current policy structure?”. In doing so, the effect of bilateral 
agreements is also researched. In this chapter the notion that Cybersecurity in itself has a 
supranational element will be key. 
 
In the third chapter, policy speed is researched. This is done by comparing the EU’s policy structure 
in the field of Cybersecurity with that of another major Cybersecurity player: the United States. This 
way, a judgement about Europe’s policy speed will be placed in a better context. The sub question of 
this chapter is: “What are the differences between the European and US Cybersecurity policy 
structure? Could and should the EU adopt certain parts of the US policy?” 
 
 
The eventual aim of the research is to make claims about Europe’s Cybersecurity policy as a whole. 
As a result, the scope is fairly broad. However, limitations are made in the researched region and 
researched policy area: the thesis only examines the European Cybersecurity policy. Thus it will not 
analyse global trends or developments in a single state. Naturally, an exception is made in Chapter 3, 
where the US Cybersecurity policy is researched – yet this is only with the aim of comparing the EU 
policy structure with other player. Besides limits on the geographical area, the research is 
Cybersecurity policy specific: it is not a general analysis of EU policy making or EU institutions. 
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Nonetheless, no distinction will be made within the term “Cybersecurity”, i.e. the thesis does not 
analyse a single aspect of Europe’s Cybersecurity policy. The reason for this is twofold: 
 
 
1) As Europe has no distinction in the term “Cybersecurity”, it is extremely difficult to make 
such a distinction in this thesis. The domains within Cybersecurity are not strictly 
separated; the differences between Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism and Cyberwarfare are 
not always clear, nor can the measures taken against these be seen in isolation. For 
example: to look at Europe’s Cyberterrorism policy, one would also have to look at 
Europe’s Cybercrime policies and the measures taken as defence against this. Thus, only 
by analysing the entire Cybersecurity policy, one can draw conclusions about certain 
parts of this policy. 
 
2) As Cybersecurity is relatively new, there is hardly any IR-literature available on the topic. 
The result is paradoxical: it is extremely difficult to study only a small portion of Europe’s 
Cybersecurity, as there would not be enough material available to do so. This is 
enhanced by the fact that most policy documents only show the outcome of discussions, 
rather than the actual negotiations – documents showing negotiations are still 
confidential and thus excluded from public use. Thus, the only option is to keep the 
scope broad – even if this means that the research has little limitation. However, 
considering the enormous literature gap in International Relations on Cybersecurity, 
having little limitation is not necessarily a bad thing: any conclusion contributes to a 
debate. 
 
 
It is important to note that the lack of distinction within the term “Cybersecurity” does not mean 
that the research analyses everything that has even remotely to do with Cybersecurity. Several 
aspects are still left out of the analysis. First of all, as the research question is formulated from an IR 
viewpoint, the thesis merely looks at relationships among countries and the influence of sovereign 
states and intergovernmental organisations on a certain policy area – in this case Cybersecurity. 
Within the field of International Relations, the author has specialised in European Union Studies. The 
European Union is an increasingly complex and fascinating political and socio-economic landscape. 
European Union Studies aims to analyse and explore these issues, by looking at the internal and 
external developments of post-war Europe and examine the current state of affairs within the EU. 
Therefore, the thesis does not look into the business side of Cybersecurity: a Cyberattack on a 
certain company is only analysed if the attack resulted in a shift in state-thinking, resulting in turn in 
a traceable impact in EU policies (or a markedly lack thereof). Hence, the civilian side is also left out: 
if a single individual or a small group of individuals receives spam, this is not an issue for the EU as 
such. As a result, this research does not look into Data Protection, since it is highly related to civilians 
and the private sector. Also, much research on Data Protection and Privacy has already been 
conducted by practitioners of law. Data Protection thus touches upon a legal analysis, rather than an 
EU-wide interstate policy analysis. 
 
Concerning methodology, this thesis provides a quantitative analysis with conclusions based on 
extensive research of existing literature – not just from the discipline of International Relations, but 
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also from the field of Law and Security Studies. Additionally, policy documents of the EU, EU 
Member States, and NATO will be researched. As mentioned earlier, this thesis does not take the 
form of a single case study, since it aims to determine the overall decisiveness of European policy on 
Cybersecurity, not just a response to one event. In the words of the American scientist Leroy Hood: 
“If you just focus on the smallest details, you never get the big picture right”.
11
 
 
  
                                                          
11
 Leroy Hood, American Scientist, Born 10 October 1938, on Brainy Quote. URL: 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/l/leroyhood652754.html  
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Chapter 1 
Developing Europe’s Cybersecurity policy 
 
 
 
“We ignore the risks that are hardest to measure, even if they pose the greatest threat to 
our wellbeing.” – Nate Silver, Author of ‘Signal and the Noise’. 
 
 
 
Smartphones, e-mail, online shopping - technological developments of recent decades have affected 
our lives immensely. The internet has become a vital part of our society. However, online identity 
theft, hacking, or even Cyberwarfare, show us that the explosive growth of the internet also has a 
downside: it has resulted in a growing number of threats related to the digitisation of society. These 
threats challenge the Westphalian idea of state sovereignty, since attackers cannot easily be 
identified: they are no longer tied to specific states or restricted by borders. To fight these new and 
evolving threats, states must develop Cybersecurity strategies capable of handling challenges 
indicative of this new security status quo.
12
 Thus, the approach against transnational cyber related 
problems should also be transnational. Citizens can only be protected from the dangers the internet 
poses, if politicians think ‘beyond their state’ and look for international cooperation. In this chapter, 
the extent of international cooperation is researched, by analysing the development of Europe’s 
Cybersecurity policy. To do so, four watershed moments in Cybersecurity history are analysed: the 
first EU initiative on Cybersecurity (a Commission proposal from 1990), the first international 
convention on Cybersecurity (a Council of Europe Cybercrime convention in 2001), the first major 
Cyberattack against a country (the attacks on Estonia in 2007), and the first Cyberweapon with 
physical damage (the use of Stuxnet in 2010). Have any of these four moments resulted in a change 
of Europe’s Cybersecurity policy? If so, in which way? 
  
                                                          
12
 Jared Brow, “The Need for Greater Transatlantic Cybersecurity Cooperation”, Blog on Issues of International 
and European Security, ISIS Europe, 19 June 2014, URL: https://isiseurope.wordpress.com/2014/06/19/the-
need-for-greater-transatlantic-cybersecurity-cooperation/ 
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1990: the first initiative 
 
When Cyberspace was still in its infancy, the EU’s Cybersecurity policy was subject to the control of 
national governments. This is first of all visible in the early suggestions for an EU Cybersecurity 
policy. In 1990, the European Commission issued a first proposal to treat Cybersecurity as a separate 
policy area. In this, the Commission expressed far-reaching ambitions to get ‘Information Security’ to 
the EU level.
13
 According to the document, the security of Information Systems was essential for the 
functioning of the Internal Market – thus the Commission should be the main decision maker in this 
area and receive the competence for decision making. As the 1990 text states: 
 
 
“The diversity of national approaches and the lack of a system of protection at Community 
level are an obstacle to completion of the Internal market. (…) A Community approach 
towards the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data is (…) 
essential to the development of the data processing Industry and of value-added data 
communication services.”
14
 
 
 
The document includes a long list of underlying values to legitimize EU policymaking, such as the 
protection of privacy, intellectual property, commercial confidentiality, and national security. Based 
on this list, the Commission argues that the ordinary legislative procedure should be used as the 
main decision making process. In this so-called ‘Community method’ the Commission is the main 
legislator, the European Parliament has amendatory powers, and the Council votes by Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV). The wish for such a supranational decision-making procedure is explicitly 
stated in the plan: 
 
 
“The proposed approach is designed to ensure a high level of protection via a Community 
system of protection, based on a set of complementary measures.”
 15
 
 
 
However, this supranational Community Method would not be achieved, as the Council of Ministers 
(representing the national governments) considerably tempered the Commission’s plans in 1992. 
Member States were not convinced that giving up sovereignty in the field of Cybersecurity would be 
                                                          
13
 COM(90) 314 final, OJ C 277/18, 5 November 1990, page 18 - in Axel Arnbak, “Any Colour You Like: the 
History (and Future?) of E.U. Communications Security Policy”, IViR/Berkman Roundtable, 18 April 2014,    
page 4 
14
 Commission of the European Communities, “Commission Communication on the Protection of Individuals in 
relation to the processing of personal data in the Community and Information Security”, COM(90) 314 final – 
SYN 287 and 288, Brussels, 13 September 1990, URL: http://aei.pitt.edu/3768/1/3768.pdf 
15
 Commission of the European Communities, “Commission Communication on the Protection of Individuals in 
relation to the processing of personal data in the Community and Information Security”, COM(90) 314 final – 
SYN 287 and 288, Brussels, 13 September 1990, URL: http://aei.pitt.edu/3768/1/3768.pdf 
10 
 
in their best interest. The Council stated that the proposal evoked the subsidiarity principle
∗
 in the 
preambles, and should be removed. This supports the Intergovernmentalism notion that the level 
and speed of European Integration in the field of Cybersecurity is determined by National 
Governments. Several of the other changes made to the Commission Document also back this 
theory. For example, the argument that Information Security was part of the Internal Market was 
found invalid. Another alteration included more representation of Member States in the Expert 
Group and the final say of the Council in cases of conflict. More importantly, the Council’s changes 
included a right to postpone actions suggested by the Commission.
16
 With this, the Commission 
effectively lost all executive power. The result was a clear setback of Cybersecurity to the 
Intergovernmental level. As Axel Arnbak has stated: “With the 1992 Council Decision, Member states 
claimed control of network and information security policy making”.
17
 
 
At the time, however, keeping Cybersecurity at the national level was not yet problematic. In 1992, 
the World Wide Web was only three years old - commercial use of the internet would not be 
introduced until 1995.
18
 Internet was still in its infancy – although threats occurred, the impact was 
limited, as only a limited number of people were connected to the internet. Thus, for the time being, 
national control sufficed. 
 
  
                                                          
∗
 The subsidiarity principle ensures that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that 
constant checks are made to verify that action at Union level is justified in light of the possibilities available at 
national, regional or local level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except 
in the areas that fall within its exclusive competence), unless it is more effective than action taken at national, 
regional or local level. It is closely bound up with the principle of proportionality, which requires that any 
action by the Union should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. 
16
 Council Decision 92/242/EEC, In the Field of Security of Information Systems, Annex - Summary of action 
lines, Official Journal of the European Communities, 31 March 1992. URL: 
http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/english/flaw!fetch.action?id=056235c9-75d6-4070-9a78-ab605e3ae84c  
17
 Axel Arnbak, “Any Colour You Like: the History (and Future?) of E.U. Communications Security Policy”, 
IViR/Berkman Roundtable, 18 April 2014, page 4. 
18
 YanTian and Concetta Stewart, “History of E-Commerce”, in: Mehdi Khosrow-Pour, “Encyclopedia of E-
Commerce, E-Government and Mobile Commerce”, IGI Global, 2006, page 560. 
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2001: CoE Convention – Progress… Yet Not. 
 
In the 2000’s the situation had changed to some extent. In ten years’ time, the number of West-
European internet users had grown to 20,4%.
19
 With the growing interconnectivity, the plea for 
international cooperation grew as well. To this end, a Cybercrime convention was organised in the 
Council of Europe in 2001 (note: the European Council and Council of Europe are two different 
institutions
∗
). The convention would give Europe’s Cybersecurity legislation a huge boost: much of 
today’s EU Cybercrime legislation still finds its origins in this convention. Some progress thus seemed 
to be made. However, it is wrong to consider this the end of Member State control. To clarify this: in 
2002, the Commission issued a proposal implementing some of the major idea’s from the 
convention. In this, the Commission copied much of the wording of the ‘Threats to Information 
Systems’ proposal from 1990.
20
 However, the Member States once again discouraged this wording: 
although the Council Decision confirmed the idea of Cybercrime legislation at the EU level, some 
major points were excluded. For instance, a terrorist attack on information systems was excluded 
from “Cybercrime”, as this touched too closely upon the notion of national safety.
21
 Terrorism was 
considered to be part of the exclusive area of national security – and thus its digital counterpart was 
also exempted from EU competence.
22
 Hence, Intergovernmentalism theory can again be confirmed 
here - governments remained the main drivers in the (Cybersecurity) integration seat: despite new 
legislation, power remained at the national level, continuing the line of government control.  
 
  
                                                          
19
 Pippa Norris, “Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide”, 
Cambridge University Press, 24 September 2001, page 47, figure 3.1: The Percentage of the Population Online 
by Major Region in 2000. 
∗
 The Council of Europe (CoE) is an international organisation of which 47 European countries are members. In 
addition, six non-European countries (as well as the Vatican) observe in the CoE. The European Council, on the 
other hand, is the institution mentioned before, in which the 28 Heads of State or Government of EU Member 
States are represented. 
20
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
“Network and Information Security: Proposal for A European Policy Approach”, Brussels, 06 June 2001, 
COM(2001) 298 final, page 9 
21
 Axel Arnbak, “Any Colour You Like: the History (and Future?) of E.U. Communications Security Policy”, 
IViR/Berkman Roundtable, 18 April 2014, page 18. 
22
 Axel Arnbak, “Any Colour You Like: the History (and Future?) of E.U. Communications Security Policy”, 
IViR/Berkman Roundtable, 18 April 2014, page 18. 
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2007: Estonia 
 
In the spring of 2007, the notion of arranging Cybersecurity on the national level was severely 
challenged for the first time, when Estonia became the target of a major Cyberattack. The events in 
Estonia shocked the world: websites of Estonian organizations, banks, parliament, ministries, 
newspapers and broadcasters were flooded with data (some sort of “Data Tsunami”), leaving them 
inaccessible for nearly three weeks. Not only was this the first Cyberattack on such a major scale and 
continuing for such a long time, it was also the first time that a Cyberassault occurred against a state. 
Many suspected Russia to be behind the attacks, since they had started after commotion about 
Estonian removal of a Bronze Soviet war memorial in Tallinn. Also, the attacks gradually intensified, 
with the number of attacks being the biggest on the 9
th
 of May – the day that Russians 
commemorate Hitler’s defeat in Europe. Soon, therefore, media started to label the attacks as “the 
first case of Cyberwarfare”.
23
 
 
As Estonia was both a member of the EU and NATO, both of these parties were obliged to respond 
quickly. However, neither had protocols for such a situation. After all, up to the 2007 attacks, 
national control (Intergovernmentalism) had proved to be sufficient to deal with Cyberthreats. 
However, from 2007 onwards, this was no longer the case – Cybersecurity could clearly only be dealt 
with by international cooperation. For NATO, especially, Estonia proved to be a wake-up call.
24
 With 
the alleged Russian involvement, Cyberwarfare was no longer just a future scenario – NATO had to 
decide whether or not they would frame Cyberattacks under Article V, which provides a collective 
self-defence system as soon as a NATO member state is attacked.
25
 However, some NATO members 
remained cautious, stressing the importance of national sovereignty. NATO was able to solve the 
framing-problem in a relatively short period of time (first framework set up in June 2007, actual 
implementation of the strategy in 2008).
26
 The solution to the Article V problem was to frame 
Cyberattacks under Article IV, which states that: “…parties will consult together whenever, in the 
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the 
Parties is threatened”.
27
 With this solution, NATO elevated Cyberattacks to warfare status, but it did 
so under a framework of collaboration and consulting, rather than an automatic collective response 
to an attack against a NATO member.
28
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In the EU however, though Estonia proved to be a wake-up call regarding the severity of threats, the 
long term policy implications were slow and limited. Where NATO had a solution to the Article V 
problem in two months, the EU did not present new solutions to Cyberthreats up to 2010.
29
 Also, the 
EU’s answers came mainly in the form of new laws, rather than an actual switch in policy making. For 
example, in November 2010, the EU released its Internal Security Strategy, calling for an integrated 
responses to Cybersecurity threats and significantly expanding the European Network and 
Information Security Agency's responsibilities (beyond its previously limited analytical role). The EU 
also launched a new Digital Agenda for Europe, which included plans to establish CERTs
∗
 for EU 
institutions, hold multinational Cyberdefence simulations, and create a joint European Cybercrime 
platform.
30
 It thus might seem as if the EU released its Intergovernmental character of Cybersecurity 
policy. On closer inspection, however, both initiatives clearly show a national grip on Cybersecurity. 
 
The first initiative, the Internal Security Strategy, was launched in the AFSJ
∗
 framework. This suggests 
that the Commission was the main actor in the legislation process. However, the strategy was 
adopted under Article 68 TFEU, which states that: “The European Council shall define the strategic 
guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice”.
31
 Although the Internal Security Strategy was adopted under the AFSJ, the main actor in 
power was thus the European Council. As the European Council decides by consensus rather than by 
Qualified Majority Voting, each Member State (in line with Intergovernmentalism theory) kept their 
voice in Cybersecurity matters. I.e., power remained with the Member States.  
 
The second initiative, the Digital Agenda for Europe (including the CERTs proposal) was adopted as 
part of the Europe2020 strategy. This strategy is rooted in a policy and legislation procedure known 
as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).
32
 The OMC was set up in 2009 as a new framework for 
cooperation between the Member States to direct national policies towards certain common 
objectives. Under this intergovernmental method, Member States are evaluated by each another 
(peer pressure), and the Commission's role is limited to surveillance.
33
 This once again shows the 
power of the Member States in the area of Cybersecurity  – if Member States don’t achieve the goals 
they agreed upon, no harsh sanctions will follow. The conclusion can thus be clear: Estonia provided 
a wake-up call, but no real policy shift took place - new legislation was issued, but decision making 
was kept on the intergovernmental level.  
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2010: Stuxnet 
 
In Estonia, servers of websites were flooded with data, causing serious inconvenience, yet no 
physical damage was done. This changed in 2010 when a computer worm known as Stuxnet targeted 
Industrial and Factory control systems for the first time. Stuxnet was significant – not only because it 
was (as Alan Bentley, senior international vice president at security firm Lumension has stated) “the 
most refined piece of malware ever discovered”, but also because “mischief or financial reward 
wasn’t its purpose – it was aimed right at the heart of Critical Infrastructure
∗
”.
34 
 
 
In January 2010, inspectors of Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment plant noticed that centrifuges used 
to enrich uranium gas were spinning out of control. The cause was a mystery – Iranian technicians 
replaced the centrifuges but neither them, nor the inspectors observing the centrifuges understood 
where the problem was coming from. Circa five months later a similar event took place. A computer 
security firm from Belarus was called in when a series of computers was repeatedly crashing and 
rebooting. After an extensive search, the researchers found a few malicious files on one of the 
systems. Stuxnet, as the malware became known, was unlike any other virus or worm ever seen 
before. Technically, the malware was extremely advanced. To explain this more technical story: the 
worm only looked for a specific piece of hardware in industrial systems – only if a certain chip would 
be found in a system, the worm would be triggered. Typically, the chip the worm was looking for was 
made by Siemens and used in factory floors, chemical plants and nuclear power plants.
35
 As this 
specific Siemens-chip was assumed to be used in Iran’s Nuclear enrichment facilities, suspicions 
were made soon after the attack that Stuxnet was aimed specifically at Iran’s Nuclear programme. 
Another Stuxnet characteristic was that it did not threaten with sabotage, like a criminal 
organization would do, but instead performed sabotage itself - rather than simply hijacking targeted 
computers or stealing information from them, Stuxnet escaped Cyberspace to wreak physical 
destruction on equipment the computers controlled.
36
 In the end, Stuxnet eliminated approximately 
one fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and significantly hampered Iran’s ability to make its first 
nuclear arms.
37
 With this, Stuxnet became the first Cyber weapon in history to cause physical 
damage. 
 
For Europe, Stuxnet resulted in the classic paradox that we have seen before: more awareness, yet 
holding on to national control. Initially, Europe was shocked by Stuxnet. The European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) stated in its initial comment that Stuxnet was “really a 
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paradigm shift, as it is a new class and dimension of malware.”
 38
 The executive director of ENISA, Dr. 
Helmbrecht, even said: 
 
 
“After Stuxnet, the currently prevailing philosophies on Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection (CIIP) will have to be reconsidered. They should be developed to withstand these 
new types of sophisticated attack methods. Now that Stuxnet and its implemented principles 
have become public, we may see more of these kinds of attacks. All security actors will thus 
have to be working more closely together and develop better and more coordinated 
strategies.”
39
 
 
 
It thus might seem as if Stuxnet resulted in more coordination at last. To some extent Stuxnet was 
indeed a paradigm shift for the EU– as Stuxnet had targeted so called “Critical Infrastructure”, 
Europe feared a similar attack. After Stuxnet, many EU Member States classified Cyber as the 5
th
 
domain of Warfare, established dedicated Cyber Commands, and/or set up National Cyber 
Strategies. This can be made apparent from the fact that most Cybersecurity strategies date back to 
2011 – with exception of Estonia, which set up a strategy in 2008, which is notably one year after the 
DDOS-attacks.
40
 On the EU level, however, not much changed. One explanation for the little impact 
of Stuxnet on the EU level, could be that Stuxnet was a Cyberweapon with a physical target, aimed 
to destruct Critical Infrastructure. As will be argued further in chapter two, this makes it more 
NATO’s discipline than that of the EU. Where the Estonia attack mostly had a civilian target (banks, 
ministries, accessibility to the internet for the general public), the Stuxnet attack had much more of 
a military target: it was a specific attack against a facility with great strategic value – proven by the 
fact that it helped delay Iran’s ability to make nuclear arms.
41
 
 
In explaining the lack of tangible EU response to the Stuxnet attacks, it is also important to note that 
Europe had already made plans for Critical Infrastructure Protection before the 2010 Stuxnet 
attacks. For example, in 2009, the Commission issued the Communication “Protecting Europe from 
large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security, and resilience”. In this 
proposal, the Commission defined a plan for immediate action to strengthen the resilience of Critical 
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Infrastructures.
42
 In this sense, we can see a similar trend as with Estonia: the event might have 
speeded up parts of pending legislation, but an actual policy shift stayed out. The overall decision 
making in the field of Cybersecurity was kept at the intergovernmental level. Even ENISA recognized 
this: spokesman Ulf Bergstrom stated that it is fundamentally up to each Member State to decide 
upon the implementation of a security policy. In explaining this, Bergstrom says “ENISA sees itself as 
a Matchmaker or Switchboard of best (security) practices, and what practices could work better in 
which Member State.”
 43
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Chapter Summary 
 
To conclude, the theory of Intergovernmentalism explains best why Cybersecurity is dealt with the 
way that it is: Member States view Cybersecurity as part of their national security strategies, rather 
than something that should be dealt with at the EU level. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Commission 
proposals to get Cybersecurity to the EU level were therefore rejected. At the time, a national 
approach might have been sufficient to deal with threats. However, the 2007 Cyberattacks on 
Estonia and the 2010 Stuxnet disruption have made the EU and its Member States realise that more 
coordination and cooperation is necessary. Strangely, however, this realisation has not resulted in a 
transfer of competences to the EU level. The amount of (pending) legislation in the field has 
increased – but no actual policy shift can be found. In this, we can clearly recognize the 
Intergovernmentalism notion that Member States are the main actors in the integration process: 
national leaders continue to view Cybersecurity as part of their national security strategies - and 
thus something they want to keep their grip on. Although international cooperation was sought 
more often after the 2007 and 2010 attacks, the national character of Cybersecurity was sustained. 
After 2007, governmental preferences converged to some extent, but not enough to get 
Cybersecurity to a supranational decision making procedure. Power remained separated over the 28 
Member States. Perhaps, as Nate Silver has stated, the EU Member States choose to “ignore the 
risks that are hardest to measure, even if they pose the greatest threat to their wellbeing”. However, 
the implications of keeping Cybersecurity on the intergovernmental level would be huge – why and 
how this is the case, will be explained in chapter two. 
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Chapter 2 
Chaos without Coordination 
 
 
 
“In any moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best 
thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing.” – Theodore 
Roosevelt, 26th US President. 
 
 
 
Although Roosevelt’s statement was made more than a century ago, it is still relevant for policy 
making today. The interconnected world we live in, is bursting with opportunities– but it also 
threatens our security in an unprecedented way. This borderless security challenge deems an active 
international approach. Estonia and Stuxnet have made Europe realise this. Thus, a number of 
initiatives have been launched by various EU institutions as well as by Member States. For example, 
The Netherlands launched a Defence Cyber Strategy, Germany has a National Cyber Security Council 
and Response Centre, and France has an Information System Defence and Security Strategy. From 
the EU level a Cyber Security Strategy has also been launched. Nevertheless, this might not be 
enough. In this chapter, the current Cybersecurity policy situation is therefore researched. The sub 
question in this chapter is “What barriers exist in this current policy structure?”. In researching this, 
the second criterion for decisiveness (amount of independent actors) of Cox and McCubbins is 
central. 
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Barrier 1: Willingness to share information 
 
A first barrier in Cybersecurity policy is that Member States have little willingness to share 
information on Cyberthreats. The willingness to share information between Member States is key: a 
single EU Cybersecurity policy can only be set up when parties actively share information on threats. 
Currently, sharing information is often a matter of “quid pro quo”. Only if party X shares something 
with party Y, Y will also share something with X.
44
 This passive form of cooperation is in sharp 
contrast with the active cooperative attitude that Cybersecurity (due to its transnational character) 
demands. Pro-active information sharing is essential for a decisive EU strategy – keeping 
Cybersecurity on national level will result in all Member States being vulnerable.
45
 This is especially 
true since (unlike classic attacks) Cyberattacks can be difficult to trace.
46
 The attackers nationality 
can differ from the place where he or she carries out the attack. The computer the attacker operates 
from could have a server in another country. The country the attacker attacks, could differ from all 
of these countries. To complicate things further attackers usually use IP spoofing
∗
 or a hidden IP 
address. As a result of all these factors tracing the attacker might be extremely difficult. Only by 
sharing information multi-nationally these issues can be tackled. This way tracing and prosecution 
can be made feasible. 
 
An example of this the Cyberattack “Operation Payback”, carried out in 2013. Under this operation, 
the websites of MasterCard and PayPal, the Swedish Public Prosecutor and Swiss Postbank were 
targeted by WikiLeaks sympathizers. After a few days, a Dutch teenager was arrested in the 
Netherlands – but the possibility of more hackers being involved outside the Netherlands was not 
ruled out.
47
 The example shows both the perks and need for international cooperation: in this case, 
the situation turned out satisfactory - due to international cooperation and information sharing, the 
Dutch authorities were quick to arrest the teenager and bring him to (Dutch) court. However, what 
would happen if this was not a Dutch teenager? What if an Hungarian teenager would hack the Swiss 
bank from a computer in Paris, while using the IP of a Dutch computer and a server in Italy? This 
would complicate the tracing process - if countries do not share information, the hacker could easily 
remain hidden or flee the state they performed the attack from. This is made worse by the fact that 
there is no obligation for Member States to share information on a European level.
48
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Barrier 2: No Common Definition 
 
A second barrier is that there is no common definition on what “Cybersecurity” or “Cyberattack” 
exactly entails. Currently, the terms are being used for (defence against) all sorts of attacks. There is 
no clear distinction between Cyberwarfare, Cyberterrorism, Cyberespionage, Cyberintrusion or 
Cybercrime. Furthermore, there is no distinction between attacks from private individuals (in the 
legal sense of the word) against other private individuals, attacks from states against other states, 
private individuals against the state, and states against private individuals.
49
 Here, a major problem 
comes up: as the EU has no distinction between these forms of Cyberattacks, deciding who should 
act on which sort of attack is made difficult. The result is a blurry picture of who should act in which 
case. For example, attacks from private individuals against other private individuals should be dealt 
with by national courts, while attacks from states against other states should be dealt with at the 
international level. In the same way, Cybercrime would be a matter for Europol, while Cyberwarfare 
would be more of NATO’s domain. Currently, however, each party takes up topics they feel are ‘in 
their area’. As a result, various divisions between the EU Member States,
50
 EU Institutions,
51
 and EU - 
NATO have come up. Although the need for a single definition has been addressed by ENISA
52
, the 
2013 EU Cyber Security Strategy has failed to provide one. 
53
 In the coming section, an analysis of the 
resulting divisions will be made, by looking at the EU policy from three levels: EU-NATO, EU-MS, and 
within the EU.  
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Barrier 3: Three levelled division 
 
1) Division between EU and NATO 
 
The division of policies between EU and NATO is not problematic, but even necessary to prevent the 
EU from getting into NATO’s domain. The EU has no military division - not in the conventional sense, 
nor for Cyberspace. NATO, on the other hand, is exclusively set up as a military alliance, in which 
members are committed to collective security and common defence.
54
 This distinction should be 
continued in Cyberspace. It makes sense for NATO to take up Europe’s Cybersecurity and 
Cyberdefence in the case of Cyberwarfare and state-sponsored attacks. NATO has already defined 
Cybersecurity in a narrow way, relating to the basic functions of the alliance: the protection of 
NATO-networks, setting Cyberdefence requirements, and ensure collective defence and crisis 
management.
55
 However, due to this narrow interpretation, EU action will also be necessary. Civilian 
aspects such as privacy, hacking and DDOS-attacks still have to be coped with, but are not in line 
with the military objective of NATO. The EU should therefore take up these civilian aspects. 
Naturally, some Cyberattacks will be hard to classify. Thus, coordination between EU and NATO is 
necessary to prevent policies from not being executed at all. In general, a prudent approach would 
be if each of the two would take up the topics deemed relevant, and seek coordination from there. It 
would be better for topics to be initially handled by both parties than not at all. 
 
 
2) Division between EU and Member States 
 
The case of division between EU and Member States is different from the EU-NATO division. In this 
case, division is difficult: the fact that policies are issued from both the EU and MS level, undermines 
a general EU policy. As stated by Cox and McCubbins, “many independent actors” will decrease 
policy decisiveness.
 56
 In this case, both the EU and Member States are managing Cybersecurity 
policy, which causes confusion about who should act in which case. This is especially true as 
Cybersecurity policies from Member States are not uniform. Practically all Member States have 
adopted a national Cybersecurity strategy
57
, but the content of these strategies varies from Member 
State to Member State.
58
 For example: around 15 Member States have introduced military 
Cybersecurity strategies. The other 12 Member States have addressed Cybersecurity through the 
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national security strategies already in place, if addressed at all.
59
 The national descriptions differ 
from case to case – again partly due to the absence of a common definition over what Cybersecurity 
or Cyberattack entails.  
 
These differences are problematic as they hinder the establishment of an EU-wide Cybersecurity 
approach. Member State X might prefer policy A, while Member State Y favours policy B. The 
situation thus seems to turn in circles: as there is no common EU definition and strategy, Member 
States have set up their own - however, this in turn hampers the establishment of a European policy. 
Also, the fact that national strategies received more attention than a common EU approach again 
underlines Intergovernmentalism theory.  
 
 
3) Fragmentation between EU institutions 
 
A third form of division exists between EU institutions.
60
 This is a crucial problem for the EU’s 
Cybersecurity policy, for internal fragmentation (“many independent actors”) will result in a 
decrease in decisiveness according to Cox and McCubbins.
61
 Currently, actions appear to be carried 
out by whoever finds a gap in their specific field (telecom, transport, crime, etc.). Here, the effect of 
the lack of a single definition is clearly visible: it is unclear who should act in which case of 
Cybersecurity, and thus, each party takes up topics they deem relevant. In itself, this random take up 
of action is not a bad thing – similar to the coordination between EU and NATO, it is better to take 
up topics deemed relevant and seek coordination from there, than not to take up topics at all. 
However, while the number of EU institutions involved in Cybersecurity is extensive, there is no 
single point of policy coordination from which action takes place. A Cybersecurity Coordination 
Group (CSCG) was set up in 2011, but this group only translates Cybersecurity policy into standards 
that contain technical details. It thus only functions as a technical point of coordination, not a point 
of coordination for policy.
62
 Consequently, a patchwork of EU institutions seem to work in policy 
chaos, without coordination. To illustrate this, the following section will provide a short summary of 
the current institutional landscape. 
 
The first institution bearing relations with the EU Cybersecurity strategy is the Directorate-General 
Communications, Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT). DG CONNECT issued a Digital 
Agenda For Europe in 2010, which included CERTs for EU institutions and the creating of a joint 
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European Cybercrime platform (launched from the European Council level, see chapter 1).
63
 A 
second institution dealing with Cybersecurity is ENISA, which enhances the capability of the EU, 
Member States and business community to prevent, address and respond to network and 
information security problems.
64
 The main goal of ENISA is to “Achieve global Cybersecurity through 
collaboration by acting as a body of expertise to execute technical and scientific tasks in the area of 
information security, and helping the European Commission in the technical preparatory work for 
updating and establishing EU legislation”.
65
 It thus assists Member States in developing national 
Cyberresilience capabilities. A third institution is Europol’s Cyber Crime Centre (EC3). Its objective is 
to broaden and incorporate further expertise in specialised areas. Then there is DG MOVE, the EU’s 
institution dealing with transport and mobility issues, which in 2013 launched a call for a study on 
Cybersecurity in land transport. DG HOME in turn deals with various policy issues regarding 
European Cybercrime policy, working with Europol, ENISA and the European Cyber Crime Centre. DG 
Enterprise and Industry aims to protect citizens in Europe and society from harm, through research 
and Development. Finally, the European External Action Service (EEAS) acts as the EU’s diplomatic 
service and can thus act as an interface between the EU Cyber strategy and Non-EU Strategies.
66
 
 
Clearly, this division in Cybersecurity policy executers results in an opaque and complicated 
landscape, in which it is hard to grasp who is responsible for which policy. A policy study 
commissioned by the European Parliament stated that the exercise was “undoubtedly highly 
complex”, and in the end dodged the question of a regulatory framework at hand.
67
 To address the 
problem, the EU in 2013 launched its “European Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union: An 
Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace” (EU CSS).
68
 This strategy was supposed to outline the EU's vision 
on Cybersecurity by clarifying roles and responsibilities, and propose specific activities at the EU 
level. The goal was to ensure strong and effective protection and promotion of citizens' rights so as 
to make the EU's online environment “the safest in the world”.
69
 However, as the (commercial) 
European Cyber Security Protection Alliance (CYPSA) report states, the strategy failed to address the 
problem of fragmentation in the EU: 
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“Currently, there is an impressive collection of directives, organisations, policies and the like, 
which makes it difficult to instantly and fully grasp how this broad topic is addressed within 
the EU. The fragmented and intransparent approach manifests itself in the EU CSS which is, 
despite its title, not (yet) able to singlehandedly take on the role a general European cyber 
security strategy as it lacks some essential aspects of what makes a strategy effective.”
70
  
 
 
This quote from the CYSPA report underlines that the EU Cybersecurity policy structure is 
fragmented and blurry. There are many independent actors involved in the EU’s Cybersecurity 
policy, yet there is no single point of coordination or common understanding of what Cybersecurity 
exactly entails. Combined, these factors impede collective EU action and (according to Cox and 
McCubbins’ criterion) decrease decisiveness. This is made worse by the fact that in the search for 
international cooperation Member States still act alone instead of from the EU block. How this 
bypasses, complicates, or even frustrates EU initiatives for cooperation, will be shown in the next 
section. 
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Barrier 4: Bilateral Agreements 
 
In the past few years, the EU has concluded several bilateral agreements on Cybersecurity issues 
with countries such as the US, China, Japan, Mexico and Brazil.
71
 Although there is a need for 
external policy on Cybersecurity, the EU should first get is internal activities aligned, before starting 
negotiations with other (non-EU) countries. After all, the internal EU-coherence will influence the 
position in external affairs. As former president of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek has stated: 
“The strength of the EU’s external policy is determined by its internal cohesion”.
72
 Since the EU’s 
Cybersecurity still has an Intergovernmental character, the current policy is focussed on national 
gain rather than EU coherence or cohesion.
73
 This lack of internal EU cohesion is influencing the EU’s 
external power – and thus its ability to make strong bilateral treaties. After all, how can the EU 
negotiate on Cybersecurity with external partners, if it can’t even agree among itself on this issue?  
 
James Andrew Lewis, director at the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies, has argued 
that bilateral agreements could be useful as a mechanism for Cybersecurity cooperation. 
74
 It is true 
that bilateral relationships offer a number of advantages. As Lewis claims, a state can enter into a 
relationship with individual states of its choosing, which permits it to regulate only those obligations 
it is willing to accept.
75
 From an US point of view, Lewis argument is understandable: the US is a 
dominant party in any bilateral agreement, with a clear stance on Cybersecurity issues. Nonetheless, 
at this time, bilateral agreements are not a proper instrument for the EU. As stated, many actors are 
involved in the EU’s Cybersecurity policy, and which actor takes up action depends on their 
interpretation of the term Cybersecurity. This leaves the EU vulnerable in discussing bilateral 
treaties: without a strong single point of view other major players such as the US, China or Japan 
(who do have a strong viewpoint) have the advantage in negotiations. It is likely that the EU will end 
up accepting standards brought up by the other party, just because there is no clear EU policy yet on 
certain points. Hence, only when the EU has its own stance clear on Cybersecurity issues, it can act 
as a strong and determined negotiator. This in turn will only happen when the EU organisation on 
Cybersecurity becomes less fragmented. 
 
Another problem with bilateral treaties is based at the level of the Member State. These bilateral 
treaties could complicate the objectives of EU negotiations or EU policy as such. For example, The 
Netherlands and Italy recently held bilateral meetings with the US on Critical Infrastructure 
protection.
76
 One could state that Italy and the Netherlands can be considered first movers, and that 
their agreements can be copied or scaled up to the European level in a later stage. However, in 
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reality such bilateral agreements hamper the EU external policy on two levels. Initially, the chances 
of achieving an EU agreement with the US on this topic of Critical Infrastructure Protection are 
diminished, as Member States have made their own arrangements. More important, the need to 
come to a common EU policy on such topics is also diminished, which complicates the formation of a 
EU external policy on Cybersecurity issues in general. When many of these (conflicting) bilateral 
treaties are set up, this will therefore undermine an EU policy as such. Member States will no longer 
feel the need for an EU policy, even if this would in fact improve their negotiation position. This is a 
lost opportunity, for the EU could ensure a strong block to negotiate on equal footing with other 
major powers, such as the US and China.  
 
A third problem is one Lewis himself addresses as well: bilateral treaties are simply not suitable for 
Cybersecurity, as they involve only two players. Cybersecurity by definition only works with many 
players, for it is a global phenomenon. As Lewis himself states: 
 
 
“…bilateral relationships are best suited for matters that affect only the two signatory 
states rather than for problems that are truly global or even regional in nature.”
77
 
 
 
However, bilateral agreements can be useful in case of relationships between major power blocks, 
for this would still provide the global dimension Cybersecurity needs. This can merely work when the 
negotiators are equal, for example: a bilateral treaty between the US and EU, EU and China, or China 
and US. That way, the number of bilateral treaties can be reduced to a minimum: instead of 28 
Member States signing bilateral treaties with the US, the EU would, as a single entity, negotiate one 
bilateral agreement. This is why it is necessary for the EU to convince its Member States to focus 
primarily on a common EU approach, thus ensuring that the EU will become a major Cybersecurity 
player. This would decrease the number of independent actors in the EU – and thus, in light of Cox 
and McCubbins definition, increase decisiveness. 
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Chapter Summary 
 
To conclude, the EU’s Cybersecurity approach and internal organisation is not optimal yet. Many 
barriers exist in the current Cybersecurity policy structure. First of all, sharing information on threats 
is currently a matter of ‘quid pro quo’. To effectively deal with Cyberthreats, however, pro-active 
information sharing is necessary. Second of all, there is no common notion of what ‘Cybersecurity’ or 
‘Cyberattack’ entails. Although this problem has been addressed by ENISA, no definition was 
provided in the recent EU Cyber Security Strategy. The effect is a blurry picture, in which it is unclear 
which institution should act in which case of Cybersecurity. “Triple division” is the result: division 
between EU and NATO, EU and Member States, between Member States, and within EU institutions. 
In the first case (EU-NATO), some division is inevitable, and current problems could be solved 
relatively easily with more coordination and a clear definition. The second and third case of 
fragmentation are more challenging. Currently, both the EU and Member States are managing 
Cybersecurity policy, which causes confusion about who should act in which case. This is especially 
true as Cybersecurity policies from Member States are not uniform. As a result, a coherent and thus 
decisive EU strategy cannot be set up. An EU wide definition is necessary to solve this problem. 
 
Another problem is fragmentation between EU institutions. As there is no single point of 
coordination on Cybersecurity issues, several institutions have taken up topics in their area, creating 
a true patchwork. An opaque and complicated landscape is the outcome – it is extremely difficult to 
grasp who is responsible for which policy. Though the “Cyber Security Strategy of the European 
Union” was supposed to solve this issue, it failed to do so. Considering Cox and McCubbins, we can 
conclude that the four-levelled division results in a decrease in the EU’s decisiveness on 
Cybersecurity issues. 
 
An additional problem is found in bilateral treaties. The EU has recently concluded several bilateral 
agreements with major players. However, the EU should first align its internal activities, as internal 
coherence will influence their position in external affairs. James Andrew Lewis has argued that 
bilateral agreements can be useful for several reasons. Though his views are understandable from 
his American point of view, the situation is different for the EU. As there is no single point of 
coordination for Cybersecurity policy, the EU could be vulnerable in negotiations. The EU should first 
become less fragmented, before it can act as a strong and determined negotiator.  
 
Also, bilateral agreements of Member States with non-EU countries hamper the EU’s external 
Cybersecurity policy. The need for cooperation in the specific field of the agreement will be 
diminished for the specific state making the agreement. At the same time, if many Member States 
make such agreements, the need for a common EU policy on Cybersecurity topics at large is 
undermined. Member States will no longer feel the need for an EU policy, even if this would in fact 
improve their negotiation position. This is a lost opportunity, for the EU could ensure a strong block 
to negotiate on equal footing with other major powers, such as the US and China. Also, it would 
decrease the separation of powers in the EU – and thus, in light of Cox and McCubbins definition, 
increase decisiveness. Eventually, bilateral agreements are not suitable for a global phenomenon as 
Cybersecurity. There is however an exception: in case of major power blocks negotiating as equals, 
the number of bilateral treaties can be kept low and the global dimension could be sufficiently 
guaranteed.  
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Chapter 3 
Comparison with the US: a more decisive policy?  
 
 
 
“Coming together is a beginning, keeping together is progress and working together is 
success” - Henry Ford 
 
 
 
To ensure a strong Cybersecurity policy, “working together” is crucial. As Cybersecurity policy is such 
a young policy field, it is interesting to see how other major players have ensured a decisive policy. 
This chapter compares the structure of Europe’s Cybersecurity policy with that of another major 
player: the United States. The US is a federation of states (in other words: supranational policy 
making) while Europe is still dealing with Cybersecurity through a system of cooperation. It is 
therefore interesting to see what the EU could achieve by getting Cybersecurity to the supranational 
level / community method. This chapter shortly analyses the benefits and drawbacks of the US 
Cybersecurity policy, by comparing it with the European policy. It will do so with the sub question: 
“What are the differences between the European and US Cybersecurity policy structure? Could and 
should the EU adopt certain parts of the US policy?” 
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The policy makers: DoD & DHS 
 
In the US, there is a strict hierarchical structure on Cybersecurity policy. Two departments have main 
responsibility: the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DoD). 
Both have tasks in the area of Cybersecurity, but unlike in Europe there is much cooperation and 
alignment between the departments. Crucial in this is the 2010 Memorandum of Agreement, which 
outlines which department has which responsibility.
78
 The document is extremely important, simply 
because it makes a distinction in responsibilities in the first place. Although other institutions (such 
as the NSA) are involved in US Cybersecurity policy, they only act under the management of the DoD 
and DHS. Thus, the number of actors involved in the Cybersecurity process is brought back to two. 
Remembering Cox and McCubbins’ criteria, this will increase their decisiveness. 
 
This does not mean that the EU has a different Cybersecurity policy content. Nearly all of the things 
the US does, have been done on the European level as well: establishing CERTs
∗
, raising awareness, 
protection of Critical Infrastructure, etc. However, the speed and manner through which 
Cybersecurity policy is formed is different in the US: due to their federal (and hierarchic) structure 
the legislative process is a lot quicker.
79
 Since the EU still deals with Cybersecurity on an 
intergovernmental (cooperative) level, their policy is slow and passive (as mentioned in chapter 2). 
In the US, however, an institution discovering an untreated topic can report this gap to DoD or DHS, 
after which it can quickly be translated into legislation. For example, if the NSA discovers a gap, it 
can report this to the DoD, which in turn will push the problem up towards legislative bodies. In the 
EU, this would not happen – if for example ENISA finds a gap, it would have no central point of 
coordination to report this to – instead, it will try to deal with it themselves, without knowing if 
other institutions have already done something on the matter. In this case, ENISA might make a call 
for legislation to the European Commission, but the chances of being heard are limited, as ENISA is 
only one of the many institutions, with its voice getting lost in the ‘crowd’. Also, even if the 
Commission acknowledges the problem, it will need all 28 EU Member States to initiate action (table 
3.2). 
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Separating and Coordinating: the common definition and Cybersecurity 
coordinator 
 
In contrast to the EU, the US does have a common definition on what exactly Cybersecurity entails. 
In the National Security Presidential Directive 54 several definitions on cyber topics are given. In this 
document ‘Cybersecurity’ is defined as: 
 
 
"Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic 
communications systems, electronic communication services, wire communication, and 
electronic communication, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation”
80
 
 
 
The document also gives definitions on what a Cyberattack, Cyberintrusion, Cyberexploitation or 
Cyberincident entails. The importance of these definitions should not be underestimated – by 
separating types of attacks determining who should act in which case becomes much easier. Each 
definition can be assigned to the party most suitable for it. These definitions from National Security 
Presidential Directive 54 are key, since they have been copied in other documents, such as the 
Memorandum of Agreement from 2010.
81
 This shows general acceptance of the terms. 
 
Furthermore, the US has a Cybersecurity Coordinator, Michael Daniel, whose position was created in 
2009 by President Obama. Often referred to as the “Cyber Czar”
 82
, Daniel oversees the agencies 
implementation of the national Cybersecurity strategy and policy.
83
 As he is also a special assistant 
to the President, issues can easily be passed to the executive branch. With this, the coordinator 
increases US decisiveness: the position further reduces the amount of policy levels, as it forms a 
bridge between the presidential office and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. 
 
Together, the definitions, Memorandum of Agreement, and overseeing coordinator, ensure a 
coordinated approach. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the EU has a patchwork of institutions 
with various roles and responsibilities, which is mostly problematic, because there is no coordination 
between these institutions. The combination used in the US solves this problem, resulting in a much 
more coordinated policy than the one in the EU, as can clearly be seen in table 3.1 and table 3.2. 
DoD and DHS can align through looking at the definitions, and in case of doubt can deliberate with 
the Cybersecurity coordinator. With this, deciding who should act on which issue is made a lot 
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easier. For the EU, establishing a Cybersecurity coordinator could greatly help the Cybersecurity 
Policy: it would help create a single point of coordination and overview. However, it should be noted 
that the creation of a Cybersecurity coordinator alone is not enough. It should be accompanied by a 
reduction of institutions involved, so that the number of actors would be manageable to the 
coordinator. 
Table 3.1, situation in the United States
President
Congress & Senate
Cybersecurity Coordinator
DHS DoD
NSA       USCYBERCOM       NTOC       etc NSA       USCYBERCOM       NCCIC       etc
 
Table 3.2, situation in the European Union
European Commission
Council (Member States)
Voting by Unanimity
DG CONNECT  ENISA  EC3  DG MOVE  EEAS  DG HOME  DG Enterprise and Industry  etc, etc. 
European Parliament 
(only consulted – no 
voting or veto power)
∗
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The EU’s secret weapon? 
 
In Cox and McCubbins’ definition, policy decisiveness includes “the ability to decide or pursue a 
consistent policy”.
84
 Regarding this consistency of policy the EU has a big advantage over the US. As 
the EU is not a federal government, established policies won’t be easily changed: this would again 
require all 28 Member States to reach consensus. An example are the sanctions on Russia in dealing 
with the Ukraine crisis: the EU countries were quick to decide on these sanctions, but now that 
France and Germany have concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions, turning them back is 
not that easy.
85
 
86
 In the US, however, policies established by one government could be changed by 
the next government: all that is required, is a majority of the Congress and Senate vote in favour of 
them. The examples here are numerous: policies regarding Afghanistan, the Patriot Act, 
Guantanamo Buy, the “No Child Left Behind Act”
87
, and funded research on embryonic stem cells, 
are all examples of what President Obama has changed since his predecessor Bush has left the 
office. 
 
However, in the field of Cybersecurity, this “consistency of policy” advantage for the EU is 
disproportionate to the advantages policy making in the US offers. The negotiating process between 
EU Member States only results in an outcome acceptable to all parties, instead of an outcome that is 
unacceptable to some Member States, but forced upon them through QMV voting. In the last case 
more can be achieved, while in the first case the outcome will only reflect the lowest-common-
denominator. To accelerate progress in the Cybersecurity field, the EU decision making procedure 
should therefore be set to Qualified Majority Voting - even if this means that the outcome won’t 
always satisfy all parties. However, as there has never been an initial decision to place classic Foreign 
and Security policy under the authority of central EU institutions, there is also no pressure to extend 
the authority of institutions to Cybersecurity policy. In other words, there is no spill-over effect to 
get Cybersecurity to the community method. This again confirms the Intergovernmentalism notion 
that Member States, not the EU institutions, are the main actors in European Integration in this area. 
The clear result has been mentioned before: EU policy making in Cybersecurity is slow and lags 
developments, while the US can respond to incidents much quicker. 
 
Considering all the criteria of Cox and McCubbins, the US therefore scores much better on 
Cybersecurity policy decisiveness: powers are less separated and less independent actors are 
involved in the political bargaining process. In the US, policies can quickly be adapted to new 
situations – which is something Cybersecurity, with its fast evolving character, requires. The only 
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way the EU could achieve this too, is by placing Cybersecurity under the Qualified Majority Voting, 
thus speeding up the decision making process. Comparing the EU and US Cybersecurity policies in 
light of Henry Ford’s quote, the EU is still beginning to “come together”, while the US is already 
“working together”. 
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Chapter Summary 
 
In the United States, Cybersecurity policies are arranged through a strict structure. The Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DoD) are the main responsible parties. 
Making a distinction in who takes up which part of Cybersecurity is easier in the US, as the US has 
common definitions on what Cybersecurity, Cyberattack, Cyberintrustion, etc, entails. To help 
coordinate tasks, the position of Cybersecurity Coordinator was created in 2009. Furthermore, a 
Memorandum of Agreement between DoD and DHS was signed in 2010. Together, these three 
factors ensure a highly coordinated policy. 
 
One could argue that the EU has the benefit of consistency in its Cybersecurity policies. As 28 
Member States are involved in the decision making process, policies established won’t be easily 
changed. Although this is true, the advantage is disproportionate compared to those of the US – the 
US has less independent actors and less separation of powers. This makes the US highly decisive 
according to Cox and McCubbins. The structure ensures that policies can quickly be adapted to new 
situations, which is exactly what Cybersecurity (with its fast evolving character) requires. Comparing 
the EU and US Cybersecurity policies in light of Henry Ford’s quote, the EU is still beginning to “come 
together”, while the US is already “Working Together”.  
 
To increase policy decisiveness, the EU could benefit from the instalment of a similar Cybersecurity 
Coordinator, who would overlook which EU institution does what. This should be accompanied by a 
reduction in the number of institutions involved. Although this helps coordination, it does not help 
create a faster policy environment. To achieve this, EU Member States should let go of the idea that 
national control is best and place Cybersecurity under the Qualified Majority Voting procedure. Only 
then the EU can be quick, adaptive, and decisive. 
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Conclusion: 
 
Posting pictures on Facebook, sending messages through Gmail, or transferring money using a bank 
account application – these days, technological possibilities seem to be endless. Cyberspace has 
become a vital part of both our lives and our society; but not all that glitters is gold. In recent years 
major Cyberthreats have come up, which are occurring more often and are getting technologically 
more advanced. A decisive Cybersecurity policy is necessary to protect civilians from the dangers 
that digitalization brings. For Europe, a logical way to arrange this would be in the EU framework. 
However, EU Member States have not given up their national policies regarding Cybersecurity yet. 
Currently, Cybersecurity legislation is issued from both the Member State and the European level. 
This is typical for the EU’s central question: how can European Integration be explained best and 
what this will mean for the EU’s future? While Neo-Functionalism theory states that integration is 
self-sustaining, Intergovernmentalism argues that states (national governments) are the main actors 
in the EU’s integration process. In this thesis Cybersecurity was analysed as part of the central 
debate: the clash between decision making on the national and EU level is specifically problematic in 
the (borderless) case of Cyberspace. As Europe has received much criticism on its Cybersecurity 
policy, one could wonder whether this policy is in fact decisive. An effort was therefore made to 
analyse this, with the main question: “To what extent is Europe decisive in its Cybersecurity policy?”. 
 
 
To answer the main question, it was first of all important to define the term ‘Cybersecurity’. The 
choice was made to interpret the word in the broadest sense possible: it includes any form of 
protection against any sort of Cyberattack. On a scale of impact, it is thus not limited to a single 
citizens’ privacy (on the lowest level), nor to Cyberwarfare (on the highest level). Protection against 
Cyberbullying, Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism and Cyberwarfare therefore all fall under the umbrella of 
Cybersecurity. 
 
Secondly, several criteria for decisiveness were set up. This was done by applying Cox and 
McCubbins definition of “policy decisiveness” to the EU. Cox and McCubbins argue separation of 
power will lead to indecisiveness. Also, independent actors in the political bargaining process make it 
harder to maintain collective action.
88
 I.e., the more actors, the more indecisive the EU will be. The 
definition of Cox and McCubbins was augmented with the criteria “policy speed”, since rapid 
developments in Cyberspace ask for quick policy adaption to these developments. 
 
Finally, three sub questions were set up. The first sub question was: “Have certain ‘watershed’ 
moments influenced Europe’s Cybersecurity policy? If so, in what way?”. The second sub question 
was: “What barriers exist in this current policy structure?”. The third sub question was “What are 
the differences between the European and US Cybersecurity policy structure? Could and should the 
EU adopt certain parts of the US policy?”. 
 
                                                          
88
 Definition of Cox & McCubbins as stated in Kyung Joon Han, “Policy decisiveness and responses to 
speculative attacks in developed countries”, European Journal of Political Research, Volume 48, Number 6, 
2009, pages 723-755, specifically page 730. URL: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01835.x/epdf 
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In answering the first sub question, “Have certain watershed moments influenced the European 
Cybersecurity Policy? If so, in what way?”, it became clear that several watershed moments have 
had influence on the European Cybersecurity policy - yet this is has not always helped decisiveness. 
The first watershed moment that was analysed was the Commission proposal from 1990, which 
suggested that Information Security should be set to the EU level, as information security was part of 
the internal market. The proposal suggests that the ordinary legislative procedure should be applied. 
However, the Council of Ministers, representing the national governments, were not convinced that 
they should give up their national sovereignty in this field. This was a crucial moment in 
Cybersecurity history, as the changes to the original text ensured that the Commission had no power 
over Cybersecurity policies. Thus, the further course of Cybersecurity policy would be in the hands of 
the Member States: in other words, power in this area was separated into 28 pieces.  
 
A second watershed moment came in 2001, when the European Commission put forward a proposal 
that implemented several of the ideas of a Cybercrime convention. Although the idea of Cybercrime 
legislation at the EU level was confirmed, the idea of placing this under Commission competence 
was not: major points were once again excluded from Commission competence, as they touched too 
closely upon the exclusive area of National Security. 
 
The third watershed moment came in 2007, when Estonia was the target of a major DDOS attack. 
Here, Europe’s Cybersecurity policy was influenced to some extent, as Estonia proved to be a wake-
up call for both EU and NATO. However, while NATO’s quickly adapted its policy, the EU’s policy 
implications were slow and limited. It took the EU two years to come up with solutions, and when 
these came, they mostly included new legislation, rather than an actual shift in decision making. 
Policies stayed on the intergovernmental level. 
 
A fourth watershed moment was Stuxnet in 2010. Stuxnet became the first Cyberweapon in history 
to cause physical damage. Although Stuxnet initially shocked Europe, the classic paradox from 
Estonia resurfaced: it created more awareness, but Member States still held onto national control.  
 
Thus, the main actors proved to be the Member States: from the very start, national leaders viewed 
Cybersecurity as part of their national security strategies. Although international cooperation was 
sought more often after Estonia and Stuxnet, the national character of Cybersecurity was sustained. 
 
 
In answering the second sub question, “What barriers exist in this current policy structure”, it 
became clear that the current Cybersecurity policy landscape is as opaque and fragmented. There is 
no common definition on what the term “Cybersecurity” or “Cyberattack” entails, which makes it 
hard to decide who should act in which case. The result is division on three levels: EU-NATO, EU-MS, 
and between EU-institutions. In the first case, division of politics is logical – more attention could be 
given to who takes up what, but no major problems occur here. The division between EU and 
Member States is problematic: as both the EU and Member States manage Cybersecurity policy, 
confusion about who should act in which case is caused. This is especially true as Cybersecurity 
policies from Member States are not uniform. As a result, a coherent and thus decisive EU strategy 
cannot be set up. An EU wide definition is necessary to solve this problem. The last case of division, 
between EU-institutions, is especially problematic: many EU-institutions have taken up Cybersecurity 
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in their area of expertise, but since there is no single point of coordination, no one knows who 
exactly does what. The result is patchwork of institutions, without strong management. 
 
The problem of division is made worse by the fact that Member States conclude separate bilateral 
treaties. These agreements hamper the EU’s external Cybersecurity policy, as the need for 
cooperation in the specific field of the agreement will be diminished. At the same time, the overall 
need for a common EU policy on Cybersecurity topics will be undermined. For the EU, bilateral 
agreements are not a suitable instrument for Cybersecurity either: Europe should first align its 
internal activities, as this will ensure a stronger position in external affairs.  
 
 
In answering the third sub question, “What are the differences between the European and US 
Cybersecurity policy structure? Could and should the EU adopt certain parts of the US policy?”, it 
was clear that some major differences exist between the EU and US Cybersecurity policy structure. 
In the US, Cybersecurity is arranged in a strict structure, with the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and Department of Defence (DoD) being the main actors. Due to a common definition, a 
Cybersecurity Coordinator with a direct link to the President, and a Memorandum of Agreement 
between DHS and DoD, a highly coordinated policy is ensured. However, the EU does have the 
advantage of consistency of policies. As all EU Member States have veto powers in the decision 
making process, policies established won’t be easily changed – this would again require consensus 
among 28 Member States. Nonetheless, this advantage is disproportionate to those the US has in 
Cybersecurity policy making. The US has less independent actors, less separation of power, and a 
higher policy speed, making it a highly decisive Cybersecurity player. The US structure ensures that 
Cybersecurity policies can quickly be adapted to new situations – which is exactly what a fast 
evolving phenomenon such as Cybersecurity requires. 
 
 
In concluding the main research question, “To what extent is Europe decisive in its Cybersecurity 
policy?”, the answer can thus be that although the topic of Cybersecurity has been addressed in the 
EU, the European Cybersecurity policy is not that decisive yet. In analysing the three criteria of 
decisiveness, we can see that the “separation of powers” is large. Europe is still dealing with 
Cybersecurity on the intergovernmental level. Thus, all 28 Member States share power – in other 
words, power is separated into 28 pieces, rather than merged into one piece: a single EU power. 
 
Concerning the “amount of independent actors”, Europe is once again performing poorly. The 
amount of independent actors is huge: as there is no common definition, division on three levels has 
come up: EU-NATO, EU-MS, and between EU institutions. The EU-MS division and fragmentation 
between EU institutions is especially problematic here. Currently, too many actors seem to be 
involved in the Cybersecurity policy process. There is no single point of coordination, and only little 
willingness to share information on Cyberthreats. Bilateral agreements further split the EU. 
Combined, these factors influence Europe’s Cybersecurity policy decisiveness immensely: it makes 
the EU a less decisive player. 
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The EU also has a disadvantage in the third criterion of “policy speed”. Since the EU is still dealing 
with Cybersecurity from the Member State level, the policy making process is slow and passive. It 
requires all 28 Member States to reach consensus.  
 
 
In light of the broader debate of how European Integration can best be explained, and what this 
means for the future of the EU, it thus is clear that the theory of Intergovernmentalism best explains 
the history of Europe’s Cybersecurity policy. The national approach has prevailed throughout: 
Member States are still the main drivers in the integration seat of this policy area. Although 
developments such as Estonia and Stuxnet have accelerated (pending) legislation, this can mainly be 
attributed to a temporary convergence of governmental preferences, rather than to an actual 
mentality switch to supranational decision making. 
 
Intergovernmentalism theory can furthermore be confirmed by the fact that there is no “spill-over” 
effect to the area of Cybersecurity. As classical security policy is also still in the intergovernmental 
decision making process, there are no created institutions to drive Cybersecurity forward. However, 
to increase decisiveness in the future, a more Neo-Functionalist approach would be best. The 
internet challenges traditional Westphalia notion of sovereignty: thinking in state terms will no 
longer suffice. Yet not all is lost for the EU. To increase European decisiveness in Cybersecurity 
policy, several things could be done. 
 
 
First of all, the EU could benefit from the instalment of a Cybersecurity Coordinator similar to the 
one the US has. This coordinator could then overlook which EU institution does what. The lack of a 
single point of coordination would thus be solved. However, the instalment of such a coordinator 
should be accompanied by a reduction of the number of institutions involved in the EU’s 
Cybersecurity policy. How exactly this could be done, is an interesting topic for further research. 
Furthermore, a common EU definition on terms such as “Cybersecurity”, “Cyberattack”, 
“Cyberwarfare”, “Cyberintrusion”, “Cybercrime”, “Cyberexploitation”, etc., etc. should be set up. 
The lack of such a definition results in enormous problems, as can be seen in the previous chapters. 
Besides these improvements in coordination, the EU should create a faster decision making process 
for its Cybersecurity policy. To achieve this, the EU Member States should let go of the idea that 
Cybersecurity is a matter of national safety, and place Cybersecurity under the Community Method 
(Qualified Majority Voting procedure). Only then, the EU will be a quick, adaptive, and decisive 
Cybersecurity player. 
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